# International Relations

TWELFTH EDITION

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International Relations

In a crisis, decision makers operate under tremendous time constraints. The normal checks on unwise decisions may not operate. Communications become shorter and more stereotyped, and information that does not fit a decision maker's expectations is more likely to be discarded simply because there is no time to consider it. In framing options, decision makers tend to restrict the choices, again to save time, and tend to overlook creative options while focusing on the most obvious ones. (In the United States, shifting time constraints are measurable in a doubling or tripling of pizza deliveries to government agencies as decision makers work through mealtimes.)

Groupthink occurs easily during crises. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy created a small, closed group of advisers who worked together intensively for days on end, cut off from outside contact and discussion. Even the president's communication with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was rerouted through Kennedy's brother Robert and the Soviet ambassador, cutting out the State Department. Recognizing the danger of groupthink, Kennedy left the room from time to time—removing the authority figure from the group—to encourage free discussion. Through this and other means, the group managed to identify an option (a naval blockade) between its first two choices (bombing the missile sites or doing nothing). Sometimes leaders purposefully designate someone in the group (known as a *devil's advocate*) to object to ideas.

Participants in crisis decision making not only are rushed but also experience severe psychological *stress*, amplifying the biases just discussed. Decision makers tend to overestimate the hostility of adversaries and to underestimate their own hostility toward those adversaries. Dislike easily turns to hatred, and anxiety to fear. More and more information is screened out in order to come to terms with decisions being made and to restore cognitive balance. Crisis decision making also leads to physical exhaustion. *Sleep deprivation* sets in within days as decision makers use every hour to stay on top of the crisis. Unless decision makers are careful about getting enough sleep, they may make vital foreign policy decisions under shifting perceptual and mood changes.

Because of the importance of sound decision making during crises, voters pay great attention to the

Alexandra Avakian/Contact Press Images Inc.

WORKING UNDER STRESS Crisis management takes a high toll psychologically and physiologically. President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia seemed to show this strain in 1992—just the beginning of years of civil war and perpetual crisis in that country. Shevardnadze, formerly a Soviet foreign minister, had returned to lead his native Georgia when the Soviet Union dissolved. He left office in 2003 after a popular uprising against corruption.

psychological stability of their leaders. Before Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin won election in 1992, he faced charges that he had suffered a one-day nervous breakdown when he headed the armed forces just before the 1967 war. Not so, he responded; he was just smart enough to realize that the crisis had caused him both exhaustion and acute nicotine poisoning, and he needed to rest up for a day in order to go on and make good decisions.

Whether in crisis mode or normal routines, individual decision makers do not operate alone. The government and society in which they work shape their decisions. And substate actors such as government agencies, political interest groups, and industries constrain and shape foreign policy.

4.2 Domestic Influences

Compare the influence of public opinion and interest groups on the foreign policy process.

The remainder of this chapter considers other liberal theoretical approaches that, like the democratic peace, operate at the domestic level of analysis. These approaches, in contrast to realism, see international outcomes as the result of processes within states rather than just those among states. The actions of a state in the international arena result from individual human choices—by citizenry, political leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats—aggregated through the state's internal structures. We will look at the state from the inside out, trying to understand the processes and structures *within* states that make them behave as they do.

4.2.1 Bureaucracies

Of the many substate actors that influence states' actions in the international arena, those closest to the action are the bureaucratic agencies that states maintain for developing and carrying out foreign policy. Different states maintain different foreign policy bureaucracies, but these bureaucracies share some common elements.

DIPLOMATS   Almost all states maintain a *foreign service* of diplomats working in *embassies* in foreign capitals (and in *consulates* located in noncapital foreign cities), as well as diplomats who remain at home to help coordinate foreign policy. States appoint *ambassadors* as their official representatives to other states and to international organizations. Diplomatic activities are organized through a *foreign ministry* or the equivalent (for example, the U.S. State Department).

In many democracies, some diplomats are *political appointees* who come and go with changes in government leaders (often as patronage for past political support). Others are *career diplomats* who come up through the ranks of the foreign service and tend to outlast changes in administration.

Diplomats provide much of the information that goes into making foreign policies, but their main role is to carry out rather than create policies. Nonetheless, foreign ministry bureaucrats often make foreign relations so routine that top leaders and political appointees can come and go without greatly altering the country's relations. The national interest is served, the bureaucrats believe, by the stability of overall national goals and positions in international affairs.

Tension is common between state leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats. Career diplomats try to orient new leaders and their appointees, and to control the flow of information they receive (creating information screens). Politicians struggle to exercise power over the formal bureaucratic agencies because the latter can be too "bureaucratic" (cumbersome, routinized, conservative) to control easily. Also, these agencies are often staffed (at lower levels) mostly by career officials who may not owe loyalty to political leaders.

Size alone does not guarantee power for a bureaucracy. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) has a staff approaching 400 people, compared with 5,000 people

with responsibilities for similar matters in the Commerce and State departments. The power of these agencies is their proximity to the U.S. president. The NSC chief traditionally briefs the president every morning on international security issues.

Sometimes state leaders appoint a close friend or key adviser to manage the foreign policy bureaucracy. President George W. Bush did this in his second term with his former NSC chief and confidante, Condoleezza Rice. Chinese leader Mao Zedong put his loyal ally Zhou Enlai in charge of foreign policy. At other times, state leaders may appoint rivals with differing views of foreign policy—as President Barack Obama did with his former political rival Hillary Clinton.

At times, frustration with the bureaucracy leads politicians to bypass normal channels of diplomacy. For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy demanded to be put in direct contact with military personnel in the Caribbean overseeing the blockade of Cuba, bypassing the secretary of defense and high-ranking officers.

INTERAGENCY TENSIONS   *Interagency* tensions also affect the formulation of foreign policy. Certain agencies traditionally clash, and an endless tug-of-war shapes the foreign policies that emerge. In an extreme example of interagency rivalry, the U.S. State Department and the CIA backed opposite sides in a civil war in Laos in 1960. In the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the defense ministry was usually more hawkish (favoring military strength) and the foreign ministry or State Department more dovish (favoring diplomacy), with the president or premier holding the balance.

In general, bureaucracies promote policies under which their own capabilities will be effective and their power will increase. There is a saying that "where you stand" on an issue "depends on where you sit" (in the bureaucratic structure). One can often predict just from the job titles of participants how they will argue on a policy issue. The government bargaining model pays special attention to the interagency negotiations that result from conflicts of interest between agencies of the same government. For example, after Americans were taken hostage in Iran in 1979, military and CIA officials pushed President Carter to attempt a military rescue, while the State Department vehemently opposed such a mission. After days of debate, the president decided to go ahead with the rescue mission (which proved disastrous), but he did not invite the secretary of state to the meeting where the final decisions were made.

Although representatives of bureaucratic agencies usually promote the interests of their own bureaucracies, sometimes heads of agencies try to appear loyal to the state leader by forgoing the interests of their own agencies. Also, it is not always possible to predict the preferences of leaders of bureaucratic agencies, given the goals of their institutions. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, defense officials were hesitant to commit to a military solution to the crisis, while some diplomatic officials favored a preemptive military strike.

Units within agencies have similar tensions. In many countries, the different military services (army, navy, air force) pull in somewhat different directions, even if they ultimately unite in a single voice to debate with their colleagues in the foreign ministry. Bureaucrats working in particular units or projects become attached to them. Officials responsible for a new weapon system lose bureaucratic turf, and perhaps their jobs, if the weapon's development is canceled.

Of special concern in many poor states is the institutional interest that military officers have in maintaining a strong military. If civilian state leaders allow officers' salaries to fall or the size of the military forces to be cut, they may well face institutional resistance from the military—in the extreme case, a military takeover of the government (see Chapter 6). These issues were important factors (among several) in military coups in Niger, Honduras, and Egypt in the last decade.

In general, bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the international system. Such rivalries suggest that a state does not have any single set of goals—a national interest—but that its actions

may result from the bargaining of subunits, each with its own set of goals. Furthermore, such a perspective extends far beyond bureaucratic agencies because other substate actors have their own goals, which they seek to advance by influencing foreign policy.

4.2.2 Interest Groups

Foreign policy makers operate not in a political vacuum but in the context of the political debates in their society. In all states, societal pressures influence foreign policy, although these are aggregated and made effective through different channels in different societies. In pluralistic democracies, interested parties influence foreign policy through interest groups and political parties. In dictatorships, similar influences occur but less visibly. Thus foreign policies adopted by states generally reflect some kind of process of domestic coalition formation. Of course, international factors also have strong effects on domestic politics.

interest groups Coalitions of people who share a common interest in the outcome of some political issue and who organize themselves to try to influence the outcome.

Interest groups are coalitions of people who share a common interest in the outcome of some political issue and who organize themselves to try to influence the outcome. For instance, French farmers have a big stake in international negotiations in the European Community (which subsidizes agriculture) and in world trade talks (which set agricultural tariffs). The farmers exert political pressure on the French government through long-established and politically sophisticated associations and organizations. They lobby for desired legislation and contribute to politicians' campaigns. More dramatically, when their interests have been threatened—as during a U.S.-European trade dispute in 1992—French farmers have turned out in large numbers to block roads, stage violent street demonstrations, and threaten to grind the national economy to a halt unless the government adopts their position. Similarly (but often less dramatically), interest groups form around businesses, labor unions, churches, veterans, senior citizens, members of an occupation, or citizens concerned about an issue such as the environment.

Lobbying is the process of talking with legislators or officials to influence their decisions on some set of issues. Three important elements that go into successful lobbying are the ability to gain a hearing with busy officials, the ability to present cogent arguments for one's case, and the ability to trade favors in return for positive action on an issue. These favors—legal and illegal—range from campaign contributions to dinners at nice restaurants, trips to golf resorts, securing illicit sexual liaisons, and paying bribes. In many states, corruption is a major problem in governmental decision making (see Chapter 13), and interest groups may induce government officials by illegal means to take certain actions.

Ethnic groups within one state often become interest groups concerned about their ancestral nation outside that state. Many members of ethnic groups feel strong emotional ties to their relatives in other countries; because the rest of the population generally does not care about such issues one way or the other, even a small ethnic group can have considerable influence on policy toward a particular country. Such ethnic ties are emerging as a powerful foreign policy influence in various ethnic conflicts in poor regions. The effect is especially strong in the United States, which is ethnically

Bill O'Leary/The Washington Post/Getty Images

A HOUSE DIVIDED Foreign policies are affected by the pulling and tugging of various domestic actors. Legislatures respond to these groups, constituencies, lobbyists, and media. Here, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gives a controversial address to a joint session of Congress in 2015. Netanyahu was not invited by President Obama but by Congressional Republicans, causing tensions between the United States and Israel (see also the Seeking the Collective Good box).

Seeking the Collective Good

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks

COLLECTIVE GOOD: An End to 70 Years of Violent Conflict

BACKGROUND: Since the founding of Israel in 1948, in the wake of World War II, Jews and Arab Palestinians have been fighting over the land. After several destructive wars, Israel and its main neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, arrived at a durable (though cold) peace. The Israelis and Palestinians, however, have yet to reach a peace agreement based on a Palestinian state in lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 war—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist.

In many rounds of negotiations over the years, the two sides have gotten closer. At the end of 2000, negotiators nearly reached agreement on the parameters for a Palestinian state side by side with Israel. The effort fell short, however; new governments took power in both Israel and the United States, and a new wave of violence ensued. Israeli-Palestinian peace is a collective good that would benefit each side regardless of which side made the concessions that led to an agreement.

CHALLENGE: The United States has led many rounds of fruitless peace talks. These talks have always faced great challenges as a result of the domestic politics on each side. In Israel, the parliamentary ruling coalition usually includes parties opposed to concessions toward Palestine, so the Israeli government lacks maneuvering room to make concessions even if it wanted to. In Palestine, the militant armed group Hamas controls Gaza, leaving the Israelis negotiating with a Palestinian Authority that does not fully control the territory it hoped to claim as a state. In these ways, foreign policy processes even in democracies can constrain each side's ability to make peace.

SOLUTION: Reciprocity, a strong norm in Israeli-Palestinian relations over the decades, is basic to the negotiation of peace agreements. Yet it has not sufficed, in part because domestic

Amos Ben Gershom / Israeli Government Press Office / AP Images

Israeli prime minister and Palestinian president, 2016.

constraints make it harder for governments to have cooperation based on reciprocity.

To get around these domestic constraints, the dominance principle helps. Most analysts agree that the peace talks can succeed only if the United States applies strong leadership (including pressure and inducements) to get the two parties to make concessions. Opponents on each side can then blame the United States rather than their own leaders, who thus gain maneuvering room to compromise. If an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is ever to occur, American leadership of the process will likely play a key role in reaching it.

mixed and has a pluralistic form of democracy. For example, Cuban Americans organize to influence U.S. policy toward Cuba, as do Greek Americans on Greece, Jewish Americans on Israel, and African Americans on Africa. In a 1996 U.S. Senate election in South Dakota, one candidate raised large contributions from the Pakistani-American community and the other candidate from the rival Indian-American community. But whether or not a foreign country has a large constituency of ethnic nationals within another country, it can lobby that country's government.

Clearly, interest groups have goals and interests that may or may not coincide with the national interest as a whole (if indeed such an interest can be identified). As with bureaucratic agencies, some question the view of the state as a unitary actor. Defenders of interest-group politics argue that various interest groups tend to push and pull in different directions, with the ultimate decisions generally reflecting the interests of society as a whole. But according to *Marxist* theories of international relations, the key domestic influences on foreign policy in capitalist countries are rich owners of big businesses. For instance, European imperialism benefited banks and big business, which made huge profits from exploiting cheap labor and resources in overseas colonies. This is the official view (if not always the operative one) of the

Chinese government toward Western industrialized states. During the Cold War, Marxists argued that Western foreign policies were driven by the profit motive of arms manufacturers.

4.2.3 The Military-Industrial Complex

military-industrial complex A huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, all working together to promote and benefit from military spending.

A **military-industrial complex** refers to a huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, working together to supply a nation's military forces. The military-industrial complex was a response to the growing importance of technology (nuclear weapons, electronics, and others) and of logistics in Cold War military planning. Because of the domestic political clout of these actors, the complex was a powerful influence on foreign policy in both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

States at war have long harnessed their economic and technological might for the war effort. But during the Cold War, military procurement occurred on a massive scale in "peacetime," as the superpowers raced to develop new high-technology weapons. This race created a special role for scientists and engineers in addition to the more traditional role of industries that produce war materials. In response to the launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in 1957, the United States increased spending on research and development and created new science education programs. By 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his farewell speech that the military-industrial complex (a term he coined) was gaining "unwarranted influence" in U.S. society and that militarization could erode democracy in the United States. The size of the complex gave it more political clout than ordinary citizens could muster. Yet its interest in the arms race conflicted with the interest of ordinary citizens in peace.

The complex encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has an interest in military spending. *Corporations* that produce goods for the military profit from government contracts. So do military *officers* whose careers advance by building bureaucratic empires around new weapons systems. And so do universities and scientific institutes that receive military research contracts—a major source of funding for scientists in Russia and the United States.

Subcontractors and parts suppliers for big U.S. weapons projects are usually spread around many states and congressional districts so that local citizens and politicians join the list of constituents benefiting from military spending. Early funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (or Star Wars) was given to each military service branch, the Department of Energy, NASA, and hundreds of private contractors. Recently, a similar phenomenon has emerged in the European Community (EC), where weapons development programs have been parceled out to several European states. A new fighter jet is less likely to be canceled if one country gets the contract for the wings, another for the engines, and so forth.

Executives in military industries, who best understand their industries, are often appointed as government officials responsible for military procurement decisions and then return to their companies again—a practice called the *revolving door*. In democracies, military industries also influence public opinion through advertising that ties their products to patriotic themes. U.S. military industries also give generous campaign contributions to national politicians who vote on military budgets, and these industries sometimes offer bribes to Pentagon officials as well.

4.2.4 Public Opinion

public opinion In IR, the range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state.

Many domestic actors seek to influence **public opinion**—the range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state (see the Public Opinion and International Relations box). Public opinion has greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments. But even dictators must pay attention to what citizens think. No government can rule by force alone: It needs